Kyrgyzstan II
This editorial appeared in my (news)paper this morning. I reproduce it here simply to provide one opinion by someone who knows a little bit about Kyrgyzstan. In addition to the bio blurb that accompanied this piece, I'll add that Mr. Kinzer is a former New York Times correspondent and his assignments over the years have literally covered the globe. That I'm impressed with Mr. Kinzer's credentials should not be misinterpreted as an endorsement of his opinion.
Off baseThe US use of Kyrgyzstan as a military staging ground has caused it to turn a blind eye to conflictStephen Kinzer, April 13, 2010
DESPITE ITS rugged Alpine splendor, or perhaps because of it, Kyrgyzstan is one of the world’s least-known countries. So there has been much puzzlement over the recent explosion of violent pro-democracy protest there, which forced President Kurmanbek Bakiyev to flee the capital and has apparently ended his rule.
Yet this outburst was eminently predictable. Kyrgyzstan has a better chance of moving toward democracy than any other country in Central Asia, but it is caught up in big-power rivalries and remains in the grip of authoritarian traditions of the Soviet era. Not coincidentally, it is also a reluctant host to an air base that the United States uses to supply its troops in Afghanistan.
How did Kyrgyzstan fall into the abyss of instability? Part of the answer lies in the American policy of arming, training, and financing Islamic radicals in Afghanistan during the anti-Soviet insurgency of the 1980s. Veterans of that insurgency fanned out into nearby countries, including Kyrgyzstan, determined to impose fundamentalist rule like the kind the Taliban brought to Afghanistan. Kyrgyz authorities responded with brutal tactics that stigmatized all practicing Muslims as potential enemies. This repression, combined with the collapse of social services that people enjoyed during the Soviet era, pushed some Kygyz toward radicalism.
Kyrgyzstan, though, almost escaped the cycle of autocracy that has crippled Central Asia. After unexpectedly becoming independent following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, it cast about for a national leader who could give this new nation an identity. The sentimental favorite was the novelist Chingiz Aitmatov, Central Asia’s pre-eminent intellectual and one of the few people who seemed to have a coherent idea of what Kyrgyzstan was or could be. He declined the honor, and recommended a little-known scientist and mathematician, Askar Akayev, who was duly elected and served two terms as president.
I met President Akayev in 1999 as his second term, the last allowed to him by law, was ending. My main question was whether he would step down voluntarily — something that would make him unique in Central Asian history — or adjust laws to keep himself in power. He didn’t answer directly, but told me that the 2000 elections would be “fair and transparent.’’ Soon afterward, he decided to rewrite the constitution and run for another term. His control of the electoral machinery assured his victory, and his government became more corrupt and repressive. It was overthrown in the “Tulip Revolution’’ of 2005, which brought Bakiyev to power. Bakiyev, however, proved no more responsive to public will than his predecessor. Now he has apparently paid for his misrule.
Because the United States was focused on its need for an airbase in Kyrgyzstan, it turned a blind eye to Bakiyev’s sins. Americans claimed to need the base in order to fight for democracy in Afghanistan, but to secure it, they had to support an undemocratic regime in Kyrgyzstan. This contradiction, which is inherent in any imperial project, naturally alienated Kyrgyz citizens who believe they too are entitled to live in freedom. The United States wound up looking like the enemy of groups supporting “American ideals,’’ while propping up a regime based on principles it professes to detest. Bakiyev’s son, widely seen as one of his most loathsome henchmen, was in Washington last week for what were supposed to be friendly talks; anger over America’s willingness to receive him helped set off last week’s explosion.
The United States has seen Kyrgyzstan as a military staging ground, but it is something more: a nation struggling toward freedom. Democracy has a better chance in Kyrgyzstan than anywhere else in Central Asia. If the new regime manages to consolidate itself in the coming days, the United States should approach it with humility rather than more demands. If it does, Kyrgyzstan — not Afghanistan or Pakistan — might emerge as the region’s democratic leader. That would be the kind of victory for freedom that American leaders say they want to win in this deeply troubled region.
Stephen Kinzer is the author of “Overthrow: America’s Century of Regime Change From Hawaii to Iraq.’’ (End of editorial as it ran in the Boston Globe, April 13, 2010)
My quick take is I certainly could have done without the criticism of the United States, it cannot always be our fault. And I don't subscribe to the argument that because something distasteful happened subsequent to an act by the United States that the conclusion is the United States caused the distasteful event. If Mr. Kinzer is correct in his assessment for a true Kyrgyz democracy, I am puzzled by the cautious approach he suggests for the United States in supporting any new government. Given how the Obama Administration immediately condemned the constitutional process by which the President of Honduras was removed from power just a short time ago, that it has not immediately condemned a bona fide coup suggests it sees some legs on the rebel democrats. Naturally, with what's at stake for the United States in Afghanistan, the Obama Administration needs to make sure it does not misplay the events in Kyrgyzstan.
As of this post, I do not know the United Nations official position on the coup. Ousted President Kurmanbek Bakiyev, who by all accounts I've read is a pretty unsavory character, made an appeal yesterday that his government still be recognized.