“. . . Fragile and Reversible”
A few posts back I committed to finding Gen. David Petraeus quotes that cautioned on the “success” of the surge. Well, I’m only going to produce excerpts from the General’s congressional testimony on April 8, 2008 and September 10, 2007 to support my claim.
First, from just last week:
“Since Ambassador Crocker and I appeared before you seven months ago, there has been significant but uneven security progress in Iraq. Since September, levels of violence and civilian deaths have been reduced substantially, Al Qaeda-Iraq and a number of other extremist elements have been dealt serious blows, the capabilities of Iraqi Security Force elements have grown, and there has been noteworthy involvement of local Iraqis in local security. Nonetheless, the situation in certain areas is still unsatisfactory and innumerable challenges remain. Moreover, as events in the past two weeks have reminded us and as I have repeatedly cautioned, the progress made since last spring is fragile and reversible. Still, security in Iraq is better than it was when Ambassador Crocker and I reported to you last September, and it is significantly better than it was 15 months ago when Iraq was on the brink of civil war and the decision was made to deploy additional US forces to Iraq.” (End of excerpt from April 8 testimony.)
As I recalled it to be, Gen Petraeus also claimed it be, “as I have repeatedly cautioned.” The General would never have said this if it were not true. And, if it were not true, the extremists that dominate the liberal media would have certainly exposed the General on the claim. There has been no challenge by anyone to what can now be considered fact.
But, I provide the excerpts from September, 10, 2007 nonetheless; my emphasis in bold:
“Based on all this and on the further progress we believe we can achieve over the next few months, I believe that we will be able to reduce our forces to the pre-surge level of brigade combat teams by next summer without jeopardizing the security gains that we have fought so hard to achieve . . .
“I would also like to discuss the period beyond next summer. Force reductions will continue beyond the pre-surge levels of brigade combat teams that we will reach by mid-July 2008; however, in my professional judgment, it would be premature to make recommendations on the pace of such reductions at this time. In fact, our experience in Iraq has repeatedly shown that projecting too far into the future is not just difficult, it can be misleading and even hazardous. The events of the past six months underscore that point. When I testified in January, for example, no one would have dared to forecast that Anbar Province would have been transformed the way it has in the past 6 months. Nor would anyone have predicted that volunteers in one-time Al Qaeda strongholds like Ghazaliyah in western Baghdad or in Adamiya in eastern Baghdad would seek to join the fight against Al Qaeda. Nor would we have anticipated that a Shia-led government would accept significant numbers of Sunni volunteers into the ranks of the local police force in Abu Ghraib. Beyond that, on a less encouraging note, none of us earlier this year appreciated the extent of Iranian involvement in Iraq, something about which we and Iraq’s leaders all now have greater concern . . .
“In view of this, I do not believe it is reasonable to have an adequate appreciation for the pace of further reductions and mission adjustments beyond the summer of 2008 until about mid-March of next year. We will, no later than that time, consider factors similar to those on which I based the current recommendations, having by then, of course, a better feel for the security situation, the improvements in the capabilities of our Iraqi counterparts, and the enemy situation. I will then, as I did in developing the recommendations I have explained here today, also take into consideration the demands on our Nation’s ground forces, although I believe that that consideration should once again inform, not drive, the recommendations I make . . .
“In describing the recommendations I have made, I should note again that, like Ambassador Crocker, I believe Iraq’s problems will require a long-term effort. There are no easy answers or quick solutions. And though we both believe this effort can succeed, it will take time. Our assessments underscore, in fact, the importance of recognizing that a premature drawdown of our forces would likely have devastating consequences . . . .” (End of September 10, 2007 excerpts.)
A few posts back I committed to finding Gen. David Petraeus quotes that cautioned on the “success” of the surge. Well, I’m only going to produce excerpts from the General’s congressional testimony on April 8, 2008 and September 10, 2007 to support my claim.
First, from just last week:
“Since Ambassador Crocker and I appeared before you seven months ago, there has been significant but uneven security progress in Iraq. Since September, levels of violence and civilian deaths have been reduced substantially, Al Qaeda-Iraq and a number of other extremist elements have been dealt serious blows, the capabilities of Iraqi Security Force elements have grown, and there has been noteworthy involvement of local Iraqis in local security. Nonetheless, the situation in certain areas is still unsatisfactory and innumerable challenges remain. Moreover, as events in the past two weeks have reminded us and as I have repeatedly cautioned, the progress made since last spring is fragile and reversible. Still, security in Iraq is better than it was when Ambassador Crocker and I reported to you last September, and it is significantly better than it was 15 months ago when Iraq was on the brink of civil war and the decision was made to deploy additional US forces to Iraq.” (End of excerpt from April 8 testimony.)
As I recalled it to be, Gen Petraeus also claimed it be, “as I have repeatedly cautioned.” The General would never have said this if it were not true. And, if it were not true, the extremists that dominate the liberal media would have certainly exposed the General on the claim. There has been no challenge by anyone to what can now be considered fact.
But, I provide the excerpts from September, 10, 2007 nonetheless; my emphasis in bold:
“Based on all this and on the further progress we believe we can achieve over the next few months, I believe that we will be able to reduce our forces to the pre-surge level of brigade combat teams by next summer without jeopardizing the security gains that we have fought so hard to achieve . . .
“I would also like to discuss the period beyond next summer. Force reductions will continue beyond the pre-surge levels of brigade combat teams that we will reach by mid-July 2008; however, in my professional judgment, it would be premature to make recommendations on the pace of such reductions at this time. In fact, our experience in Iraq has repeatedly shown that projecting too far into the future is not just difficult, it can be misleading and even hazardous. The events of the past six months underscore that point. When I testified in January, for example, no one would have dared to forecast that Anbar Province would have been transformed the way it has in the past 6 months. Nor would anyone have predicted that volunteers in one-time Al Qaeda strongholds like Ghazaliyah in western Baghdad or in Adamiya in eastern Baghdad would seek to join the fight against Al Qaeda. Nor would we have anticipated that a Shia-led government would accept significant numbers of Sunni volunteers into the ranks of the local police force in Abu Ghraib. Beyond that, on a less encouraging note, none of us earlier this year appreciated the extent of Iranian involvement in Iraq, something about which we and Iraq’s leaders all now have greater concern . . .
“In view of this, I do not believe it is reasonable to have an adequate appreciation for the pace of further reductions and mission adjustments beyond the summer of 2008 until about mid-March of next year. We will, no later than that time, consider factors similar to those on which I based the current recommendations, having by then, of course, a better feel for the security situation, the improvements in the capabilities of our Iraqi counterparts, and the enemy situation. I will then, as I did in developing the recommendations I have explained here today, also take into consideration the demands on our Nation’s ground forces, although I believe that that consideration should once again inform, not drive, the recommendations I make . . .
“In describing the recommendations I have made, I should note again that, like Ambassador Crocker, I believe Iraq’s problems will require a long-term effort. There are no easy answers or quick solutions. And though we both believe this effort can succeed, it will take time. Our assessments underscore, in fact, the importance of recognizing that a premature drawdown of our forces would likely have devastating consequences . . . .” (End of September 10, 2007 excerpts.)
2 Comments:
I just finished reading Ambassador Crocker's testimony to Congress on September 10, 2007.
I won't burden readers with the entire testimony but I will produce two sentences:
The Ambassador testified, "My intention today is to give you an assessment of the political, economic and diplomatic developments in Iraq. In doing so, I will not minimize the enormity of the challenges faced by the Iraqis, nor the complexity of the situation."
For those who want to read more, google "petraeus crocker testimony text" and you'll find links to their September 10, 2007 and April 8, 2008 testimony. All four statments are less than 10 pages each so it's not a lot to read if you want to know what the two most senior advisors on the war in Iraq think.
I'd still be very curious to know, if elected, will Sens. Clinton or Obama fire Gen. Petraeus. And, either way, why? Such a simple question. Such a relavant question. No doubt the question is far beyond a liberal media establishment to ask; by golly, the American people might actually learn something about the next President of the United States.
April 13, 8:55 am
Your mad, dude. Mad crazy. Gen. Patraus is a politician using the language of a politician.
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