Success in Iraq Continues III
(Shhh! But don’t tell anyone.)

Will the bad news for the pro-terrorist lobby and al Fedaban-Americans never end? Two posts in one day on success in Iraq!, what is going on here? As this post sits atop another post from earlier this morning, please make sure you get to both.

And what timing, no doubt many of you will sit next to a bitter, liberal extremist at a Thanksgiving Day feast tomorrow; now you’ll have contemporary commentary to cite (it is Thanksgiving, so please show some kindness in citing fact-based opinion).

I re-produce in its entirety some commentary from Mr. Robert H. Scales, a retired Major General and former commandant of the Army War College (so I’m assuming he knows something about war, strategy and tactics). This appeared in today’s Wall Street Journal.

Patraeus’s Iraq
The Wall Street Journal
November 21, 2007; A18

I've just returned from a week in Iraq with Gen. David Petraeus and his operational commanders. My intent was to look at events from an operational perspective and assess the surge. What I got was a soldier's sense of what's happening on the ground and, although the jury is still out on the surge, I came to the conclusion that we may now be reaching the "culminating point" in this war.

The culminating point marks the shift in advantage from one side to the other, when the outcome becomes irreversible: The potential loser can inflict casualties, but has lost all chance of victory. The only issue is how much longer the war will last, and what the butcher's bill will be.

Battles usually define the culminating point. In World War II, Midway was a turning point against the Japanese, El Alamein was a turning point against the Nazis and after Stalingrad, Germany no longer was able to stop the Russians from advancing on their eastern front. Wars usually culminate before either antagonist is aware of the event. Abraham Lincoln didn't realize Gettysburg had turned the tide of the American Civil War. In Vietnam, the Tet offensive proved that culminating points aren't always military victories.

Culminating points are psychological, not physical, happenings. The commanders I spoke to in Iraq all said that there had been a remarkable change of mood in February when Gen. Petraeus announced that they were taking the fight to the enemy by taking Baghdad from al Qaeda. He pushed soldiers out of the big (and relatively safe) forward operating bases and scattered them among really bad neighborhoods. These joint security stations and combat outposts attracted locals and encouraged them to pass on intelligence about the enemy.

To bolster local security within Baghdad, Gen. Petraeus pushed the security perimeter beyond the city's limits. In May, he began arraying combat units in four successive "belts" around Baghdad. These units painfully ejected al Qaeda influence from the suburbs and satellite cities, effectively choking off reinforcements.

In early June, the enemy miscalculated. Sensing that they were losing inside Baghdad, al Qaeda's leaders pulled out and relocated to Baquba, long an insurgent haven on the outskirts of the city. Al Qaeda propaganda refers to Baquba as the capital of "The Islamic State of Iraq." It's central to our story, because it was the last contested urban battle ground al Qaeda had within greater Baghdad. Once ejected from Baquba, al Qaeda's connection to Baghdad -- the center of gravity of the coalition's campaign -- would be broken.

Given the stakes, both sides fought fiercely for Baquba. The enemy carefully prepared a defense that included concentric rings of improvised explosive devices. Leaks from al Qaeda sympathizers within the Iraqi Army kept the enemy informed of the coalition's intentions.

The U.S. operation, called Arrowhead Ripper, began with a series of carefully orchestrated house to house assaults. This was an intelligence-driven battle with precise information, gleaned from overhead surveillance using unmanned aircraft, signals intercepts and willing Iraqis who came forward. The combat was sharp and at times furious. American casualties rose in late June; the enemy fought knowing full well that losing Baquba would force them to retreat into the empty northern deserts. By the end of July, al Qaeda's decision to regroup in Baquba left it a fractured, relatively leaderless force, stripped of concealment and popular support. Once in the open terrain of the deserts, al Qaeda fighters became easier targets for surgical hits from Special Operations teams.

But successful counterinsurgency operations don't capture fixed objectives. They create what soldiers call "white spaces," areas devoid of influence, political vacuums that compel occupancy by either an enemy seeking to rebound after defeat or by legitimate government forces seeking to establish regional control.

In Iraq now, the white spaces are being filled with a newly resurgent Iraqi military and clusters of Concerned Local Citizens Councils, which sprouted spontaneously as Sunni tribal sheikhs smelled both success and commitment from us.

To be sure, Baghdad and the surrounding belts are not yet safe. But culminating points are psychological events. What I witnessed firsthand in Iraq was a shift in opinions and a transfer of will among Iraqis, not a classic military takedown. This change was palpable and unmistakable.

Whether this military culminating point can translate into a political and economic culminating point remains to be seen. But the campaign that took place from spring until late summer reinforces the classic tenet of warfare, that success on the ground sets the conditions for diplomatic and political success.

Gens. Petraeus and Ray Odierno have achieved success on the ground at an unprecedented speed in the history of counterinsurgency warfare. Now it's time to apply the same sense of urgency and commitment to the task of reuniting the tragically fractured nation and bring it back from the brink of annihilation. (End of Wall Street Journal commentary.)